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Abstract. I review Mariano Artigas’ appraisal of Evolution as reflected in some of his 
works. I find that his perception of evolutionary theory changed from a critical attitude, 
mainly directed against the modern synthesis of the twentieth century, to a more lenient 
approach as he incorporated new elements into his reflections. However, he did not fully 
appreciate some of the advances made in evolutionary biology in recent years. I provide 
some examples, taken from the field of evolutionary genomics, which shed new light on 
why evolvability is a necessary property of living beings and how adaptation proceeds 
through the rewiring of modular gene regulatory networks, resulting in a remarkable 
degree of phenotypic plasticity. This view provides a richer understanding of two key 
elements of Artigas’ portrayal of the modern worldview: dynamism and patterning.
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Introduction
The work of Mariano Artigas was an effort to bridge the increasingly wider 
gap between the explanation of the cosmos offered by modern science and 
the image of the universe that is portrayed by religion, as a divine plan that 
unfolds through natural processes. One of the main themes in his writings 
is that science will never have the last (or exclusive) word in this dispute, 
because it cannot explain the very conditions of possibility on which it rests.
Being a physicist turned into philosopher of science, Artigas’ depiction 
of the worldview that science has built over the last century mainly deals 
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with issues arising from physics. When he refers to nature in many passages 
of his works, it seems that he is thinking mostly about inanimate beings. 
However, since biological evolution is often used as an argument in favour 
of naturalism, some of his early works deal with this scientific theory. His 
first book on evolution was published in 1985 under the title Las fronteras 
del evolucionismo (the frontiers of evolutionism). The fifth edition, published 
in 1991, included an addendum in which he commented on some recent 
scientific advances. This work was published in a revised form in 2004, with 
several changes to chapter titles and some new chapters introduced. As it 
turned out, this was the last edition of the book before his death in 2006. In 
some of his other works he also touched upon evolution, notably in The Mind 
of the Universe and in Filosofía de la Naturaleza (philosophy of nature). In 
these two books he repeats more or less the same philosophical arguments 
about the explanatory power of evolutionary theory. In a historical context 
where evolution was portrayed as the ultimate proof against the existence of 
a divine plan for the universe, his main line of argumentation was to show 
that such claim falls beyond the limits of experimental science.
It is interesting to note that, for Artigas, the “frontiers of evolutionism” 
are in fact issues related to philosophy of science, such as whether science 
will ever be able to explain divine action in the world, the creation of the 
universe ex nihilo or the human soul, as well as issues such as finality and 
chance. It is clear that these topics have very little to do with standard 
evolutionary theory, so the original title of the book is a bit of a misnomer 
as he himself acknowledges in the addendum to the fifth edition of 1991. In 
the same vein, it is interesting to note the use of the word “Evolutionism” 
in all his works in Spanish. He will only use the less ideology-charged word 
“Evolution” in the English edition of The Mind of the Universe (2001, 115).
1. The uncomfortable relationship of Artigas  
with the Modern Synthesis
I believe that Artigas’ problems with evolutionary theory can be better 
understood in the light of the previous considerations. He set out to show 
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that evolution, like any other scientific theory, could not claim to be the 
only and ultimate explanation of the natural world. As many philosophers 
of science, the path he chose to do this was to underscore the gaps in 
standard evolutionary theory. The problem with this approach is that (like 
many philosophers of science) he was not an expert evolutionary biologist, 
so many of his criticisms either lack enough depth or refer to problems that 
have been settled in the field. A case in point is his attack on what is known 
as the “modern evolutionary synthesis”.
Given that his first book on evolution dates back to 1985, the evolu-
tionary theory that Artigas chastises in his writings is the neo-darwinian 
synthesis developed in the middle of the 20th century, which relies on the 
mutation/selection paradigm as the most powerful (if not the only) evolu-
tionary force. Other basic tenets of this modern synthesis (as it was called at 
the time) are gradualism, the belief that morphological evolution in anatomy 
is the result of small incremental changes over time, and adaptationism, 
the tendency to explain all phenotypic traits as the result of adaptation 
to environmental conditions. However, after Kimura’s neutral theory of 
molecular evolution, the molecular clock hypothesis led to the recognition 
that neutrality, not selection, is the best null hypothesis in molecular 
evolution studies, thus dealing a death blow to panselectionism (Dietrich 
2013). Adaptationism was attacked by Gould and Vrba in 1982, with their 
proposal that many morphological innovations could be explained by the 
co-option of pre-existing traits or functions (exaptations) in order to solve 
biological problems, instead of relying on naive adaptationist explanations. 
More recently, in the field of comparative genomics Koonin has persuasively 
shown the insufficiency of the gradualist neo-darwinian paradigm to explain 
evolutionary changes in form and function and the appearance of new 
body plans (Koonin 2008). Today it is generally accepted that instead of 
a gradual trend towards increasing genome complexity, genome expansion 
and complexification has been the result of certain episodes of genomic 
duplication, sub-functionalization and co-option of pre-existing genetic 
modules, during which neutral or nearly-neutral innovations became fixed 
thanks to the relaxing of purifying selection in populations of small effective 
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size. In other words, episodes of rapid increase in genome complexity were 
mostly non-adaptive (Lynch 2007).
Despite of all these new insights that have extended the classical 
neo-darwinian evolutionary synthesis, Artigas’ efforts were mainly directed 
to show the inconsistencies or insufficiencies of the neo-darwinian selec-
tionist paradigm that prevailed until the 1980s. In The Mind of the Universe, 
published as late as 2000, Artigas criticizes neo-darwinian thinking without 
any reference to the neutral theory of molecular evolution or to the field 
of developmental evolutionary biology (“evo-devo”). In his 2003 book on 
philosophy of nature he already mentions Kimura’s neutral theory and other 
modern concepts such as gene regulatory networks (surprisingly, throwing 
them together with Stuart Kauffman’s theories of self-organization and 
selection in evolution), but there is still no mention of the relevance of 
developmental biology, evolutionary convergence, comparative genomics 
or ecological constraints.
One would have expected to find these ideas discussed in his last book 
on evolution, the 2004 edition of Las fronteras del evolucionismo, in which 
Artigas includes a whole new chapter on “La evolución del evolucionismo”. 
However, it is somehow disappointing that he focuses on a critique of Mayr’s 
2001 edition of What Evolution Is and Gould’s The Structure of Evolutionary 
Theory, published in 2002. In my opinion, this shows that he was more 
comfortable discussing classical darwinian theory than incorporating recent 
advances in evolutionary biology to his argument. For instance, Artigas 
is very critical of adaptation as a universal explanation for every trait, so 
I find it hard to understand that he fails to comment on “The Spandrels of 
San Marco”, the hotly debated 1979 paper by Gould and Lewontin in which 
they deal precisely with this issue and criticize the adaptationist narrative 
in evolutionary literature.
In fact, there is at present a hot debate in the field of evolutionary 
biology as to whether the evolutionary synthesis needs a rethink or not 
(Laland et al. 2014). It might be argued that this discussion unfolded after 
the death of Artigas in 2006, but the ideas that are now being debated had 
been circulating in the scientific literature for some years. As I said before, 
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I believe that he was not aware of the full extent of the “evolution of evo-
lutionary theory” over the last decades and that he missed the subtleties of 
these debates because he was not as conversant with evolutionary biology 
as he was with topics related to physics.
Judging from his writings it is fair to say that, over the time, Artigas 
took a more lenient approach towards evolutionary explanations. Despite 
his personal evolution on this matter, however, he never reached a full 
understanding of modern evolutionary theory as it is formulated in the 21st 
century. Here I will try to explain how recent developments in evolutionary 
biology, particularly in the field of comparative genomics, fill some of the 
gaps and insufficiencies that Artigas exposed in his critique of the neo-dar-
winian evolutionary synthesis.
2. Random mutations and selection
One of the main points of neo-darwinian theory that is attacked by theist 
philosophers of science is the “randomness” of mutations and the “blind” 
behaviour of natural selection, and Artigas was no exception to this. However, 
in The Mind of the Universe he makes an interesting observation about genetic 
variation and natural selection as a cause of order in nature:
Natural selection should be considered a cumulative process and not purely 
random play. Indeed, when a certain level of organization has been reached, 
genetic variations and the subsequent natural selection act within the restricted 
range of possibilities permitted by that present organization. As natural selection 
progresses, many possibilities will be discarded and new possibilities will arise. 
(Artigas 2001, 116)
He concludes that the probability of arriving at a highly organized state 
increases when previous steps have already led to organized entities and 
processes. To him this shows the existence of some intrinsic principles 
of organization so that not everything can be explained by blind forces. 
A similar concept in evolutionary biology is that of “constraint”.
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In another passage of The Mind of the Universe Artigas is discussing the 
role of chance and lawfulness to create patterns and self-organization. He 
proposes that many cooperative features of nature have yet to be discovered, 
particularly in the field of evolutionary theory:
Despite the claims of orthodox Darwinians who consider natural selection as the 
chief cause of evolution, other scientists continue searching for new structural 
laws that may help bridge the many gaps within the evolutionary explanations. 
Empirical research has found some promising clues in the field of genetics, 
where the complex combinations of different levels of genetic regulation could 
explain how a particular mutation can sometimes produce big and yet viable 
change. (Artigas 2001, 95)
This is a particularly interesting insight, and I find it surprising that Artigas 
did not develop this idea further in later works, particularly in the last 
edition of Las fronteras del evolucionismo. Had he been more familiar with 
advances in evolutionary genomics, he would have found that some of those 
“structural laws” are well known to evolutionary theory. In fact, we know 
that not all genetic mutations are equally relevant to natural selection. 
To understand this, one must consider that the levels of generality and 
specificity found in nature are the result of the evolutionary history of 
organisms. As organisms diversify they will share many properties, more 
at the beginning, less as their lineages progress along their own separate 
ways. Descent (historical relatedness) and definition (shared properties) are 
two closely intertwined aspects of the same process of causation. For the 
biologist who considers the evolutionary past, the particular morphology 
and physiology of an organism are precisely the result of its evolutionary 
trajectory. The “intrinsic” properties of an organism are inseparable from its 
particular evolutionary history. Therefore, considering the evolutionary past 
is the best way to understand what an organism is and why it has developed 
a particular set of properties. The question “why does a specific cluster of 
properties coexist in a given organism?” can only be answered in the light 
of the evolutionary past of that organism.
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Two properties of mutations are very important in this regard, be-
cause they can explain not only historical constraints but also how some 
mutations can “produce big and yet viable change”. These properties are 
epistasis and pleiotropy. Epistasis is a type of genetic interaction by which 
the combined phenotypic effect of two or more genes is weaker (negative 
epistasis) or stronger (positive epistasis) than the additive effects of each 
gene. Therefore, it is like the genetic “memory” of the evolutionary history 
of organisms. Pleiotropy refers to mutations with multiple phenotypic 
effects (“big” mutations in Artigas’ words). As expected, they are rarely 
viable (particularly when they affect developmental genes), so they should 
be eliminated by natural selection and hardly contribute to evolutionary 
adaptation. I will address first how epistasis can favour certain mutations 
during evolutionary change, whereas the role of pleiotropy will be present 
in several discussions throughout the rest of this article. I am sure that 
Artigas would have found these concepts very useful.
3. Macroevolution in the light of genomics
In biology, form is generally understood as body plan (bauplan), that is, the 
external shape, internal anatomy and particular physiology of an organism 
(classically referred to as “form and function”). These features are the 
result of a very specific developmental program encoded in the genome 
and deployed through transcriptional and regulatory networks that interact 
with environmental cues in a particular ecological context. As mentioned 
above, the gradualist neo-darwinian paradigm cannot satisfactorily account 
for such changes, so explaining how body plans evolve is one of the major 
challenges of evolutionary biology.
The need to understand macroevolutionary transitions and the dis-
covery of “macromutations”, such as mutations in homeotic genes1, led 
Goldschmidt (1940) to propose the concept of “hopeful monsters” to explain 
macroevolution. Even though experimentally induced macromutations 
1 Homeotic genes encode proteins involved in the formation of basic body structures du-
ring development.
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resemble evolutionary transitions, no such mutations have been shown 
to account for the appearance of body plans, as they would involve large 
pleiotropic and epistatic effects. It was later demonstrated that mutations 
with pleiotropic and epistatic effects, especially if they affect developmental 
genes, usually decrease fitness and are eliminated by natural selection, 
so they will very rarely become fixed in large populations. Therefore, the 
concepts “macromutation” and “hopeful monsters” were abandoned. In the 
light of genomic studies performed over the last decade, we are now closer 
to a global explanation of the evolution of form that includes the relative 
contribution of gene duplication and non-coding regulatory DNA, given 
the constraints imposed by pleiotropy and epistasis.
3.1 Epistasis and evolutionary history
Mutagenesis experiments have shown that, while many different mutations 
can lead to similar phenotypic changes in the laboratory, only a subset of 
them are found in naturally evolving populations (Stern 2011, 4). One of 
the reasons for this is the presence of epistatic effects. In the context of 
evolution, epistasis explains the historical memory of organisms, because 
a mutation can display distinct phenotypic effects depending on its particular 
evolutionary trajectory (that is, the number of potential epistatic mutations 
that the organism has acquired throughout its evolutionary history). Previ-
ous mutations affecting developmental pathways could mask (or unmask) 
phenotypic effects of new mutations. Using a graphical example, mutations 
in a gene called ultrabithorax lead to the appearance of a new thoracic 
segment with an additional pair of wings in flies, but cannot have the same 
result in a primate due to the vastly different developmental programs that 
primates and insects have configured throughout their separate evolutionary 
trajectories. In other words, the evolutionary past imposes clear constraints 
on what an organism can and cannot become.
A recent example that helps to illustrate the importance of epistasis in 
evolution is the dissection of the molecular changes that led to trichromatic 
vision in primates over the last 90 million years (My). The blue-sensitive 
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visual pigment in humans evolved from the UV-sensitive pigment in the 
Boreoeutherian ancestor by seven mutations. During the period between 
45 and 30 My ago, when the human pigment was in the final stage of de-
veloping its blue-sensitivity, two red-sensitive pigments appeared by gene 
duplication and one of them became green-sensitive. Thus, trichromatic 
colour vision in the human lineage was fully developed by 30 My ago through 
inter-protein epistasis among the three visual pigments, in such a way that 
the evolutionary pathway could only be completed when several of the 
changes combined in a particular sequence of events (Yokoyama et al. 2014).
3.2. Relaxing pleiotropy by gene duplication
The comparison of sequenced genomes from many different species has 
shown the importance of gene duplication as a major evolutionary mech-
anism. After a gene is duplicated (an event that cannot be considered 
“gradual”), one of the copies of the gene usually retains its original function 
whereas the other copy can be neo-functionalized (that is, mutated so that 
it serves a novel function) or sub-functionalized (so that its expression is 
restricted to one or a few tissues). The presence of an intact original copy 
of the gene relaxes the strength of purifying selection on the other copy 
so that even pleiotropic mutations in developmental genes could bypass 
pleiotropy and become fixed, especially in populations of small size. A very 
good example is the burst of segmental duplications that took place in the 
genomes of African Great Apes which is thought to have played an important 
role in extending the repertoire of gene functions required for the evolution 
of the human brain (Marques-Bonet et al. 2009). Recently, one of these 
duplications (involving a gene known as SRGAP2) was studied in greater 
detail (Dennis et al. 2012). As a result of three consecutive duplications, 
there are four different copies of SRGAP2 in the human genome. The 
original copy (known as SRGAP2A) underwent a duplication 3.4 My ago, 
an event that created a copy called SRGAP2B. Later, SRGAP2B duplicated 
twice independently to originate SRGAP2C (2.4 My ago) and SRGAP2D 
(1 My ago). What is interesting is that the protein encoded by SRGAP2A 
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prevents synapse formation in the cortex of the brain, whereas SRGAP2C 
has the opposite effect. In fact, when scientists introduced SRGAP2C in mice 
(which only have the original copy SRGAP2A, but do not have SRGAP2C) 
synapse formation accelerated in the brains of the animals. The temporal 
coincidence of this duplication with the first recognizable stone tools made 
by humans (about 2.5 My ago) and with the increase in brain size that we 
see in hominin fossils suggests that it may also have contributed to shape 
the human brain.
Another example of the crucial role of duplications in the evolution 
of form comes from the sequencing of the genome of the elephant shark 
(Callorhinchus milii), which revealed that the replacement of cartilage in 
cartilaginous fish (chondrichthyes) for bone in fish with bony skeletons 
(osteichthyes) could have been the result of a series of duplications involving 
a gene called Sparc in the ancestor of sharks and bony fish (Venkatesh et al. 
2014).The initial duplication of Sparc gave rise to another gene called Sparcl1. 
Later, a series of tandem duplications of Sparcl1 in the bony fish ancestor 
created a new gene family known as SCPP, which is responsible for bone 
formation. When scientists knocked down some of the genes belonging to 
this gene family in zebrafish embryos, their skeletons lost bone, supporting 
a role in bone formation in osteichthyes.
3.3 Non-coding regulatory elements
However, mutations that affect the protein-coding region of genes seem to 
be rare in developmental genes, particularly during the evolution of body 
plans. To explain this, King and Wilson proposed in 1975 that evolution-
ary changes in anatomy would be based preferentially on changes in the 
control of gene expression (King and Wilson 1975). Thirty years later, after 
reviewing the literature, Carroll argued that there was an “adequate basis to 
conclude that the evolution of anatomy occurs primarily through changes 
in regulatory sequences” (Carroll 2005). Genomic analyses performed over 
the last decade have only reinforced the view that evolution of non-coding 
regulatory DNA is a major contributor to the evolution of form.
4(2)/2016 107
B R E A K I N G M A R I A N O A RT I G A S’ F RO N T I E R S O F E VO L U T I O N I S M
Large-scale genomic projects undertaken over the last few years have 
identified thousands of regulatory regions in the human genome (Bernstein 
et al. 2012). Such regions behave as enhancers or silencers of gene expression 
and can be defined by specific epigenetic modifications, chromatin acces-
sibility and occupancy by transcription factors. Notably, a large proportion 
of them are highly conserved in the genomes of many animal groups. These 
Conserved Non-coding Elements (CNEs) represent a set of transcriptional 
enhancers that regulate the expression of genes coding for proteins involved 
in developmental pathways (Vavouri and Lehner 2009).
Conserved non-coding regulatory sequences have all the characteristics 
that make them ideal candidates to explain the diversification of animal body 
plans. First, they regulate the expression of developmental genes, which 
greatly expanded during the period of rapid diversification of animal body 
plans (Larroux et al. 2008). This expansion in the repertoire of developmental 
genes led to a high degree of complexification of developmental networks. 
However, the same basic set of regulatory genes controls development in 
different animal groups. Therefore, different animal morphologies must be 
explained by the re-deployment of the same genes in various alternative 
regulatory circuits, leading to gene-regulatory networks of different topolo-
gies (Erwin and Davidson 2009). Extensive rewiring of these gene-regulatory 
networks during the early period of animal evolution led to the appearance 
of the core developmental programs of extant major animal phyla. Since 
then, body plans in animals have been highly conserved, with the result that 
CNEs are evolving very slowly and are highly conserved within each animal 
group (Vavouri et al. 2007). Consistent with this, a comprehensive search 
for non-coding regulatory elements conserved between protostomes and 
deuterostomes found only two examples, suggesting that the deployment 
of novel developmental programs necessary for deuterostome development 
would have been mostly the result of rewiring pre-existing genetic networks 
(Clarke et al. 2012).
An impressive example of the fact that changes in conserved non-coding 
regions of the genome mirror macroevolutionary trends in morphology 
and anatomy comes from a recent study by Lowe et al. Comparing forty 
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vertebrate genomes, they identified several million CNEs. They could also 
determine when such elements became regulatory over the last 600 My and 
which genes they regulate (Lowe et al. 2011). Notably, the most ancient set 
of CNEs (those that became active between 600 and 300 My ago) regulate 
the activity of transcription factor and developmental genes, confirming 
the extensive rewiring of developmental networks that took place at the 
time of diversification of animal body plans.
More recent studies are only adding weight to the hypothesis that 
evolutionary innovations in form and function have been primarily the 
result of changes in regulatory sequences. The transition from water to land 
by tetrapods during the Devonian required the loss of the fin rays and the 
emergence of an autopod with digits in the tetrapod limb. The insertion of 
a regulatory element from the mouse HOXD cluster in zebrafish embryos 
increased hoxd13 activity and recapitulated both of these changes (Freitas 
et al. 2012).
Similar findings have been made with regard to the evolution of the 
human brain. Reilly et al. (2015) have recently identified thousands of 
regulatory elements involved in the formation of the neocortex during the 
first weeks of human embryonic development, which however do not display 
such activity in rhesus macaque brains. Another remarkable example is the 
finding that a human CNE regulating the expression of a neurodevelopmental 
gene, when inserted in the mouse genome, leads to a 12% increase in brain 
size in mice, whereas the chimpanzee version of such element does not (Boyd 
et al. 2015). These recent studies support the notion that macro-evolutionary 
transitions in form are the result of changes in non-coding elements that 
control the expression of developmental genes.
4. Tinkering your way to evolutionary success
Throughout his writings, Artigas was adamant that the present worldview 
shows a grandiose process of self-organization driven by information, in 
which an internal dynamism is constantly creating new spatial and temporal 
patterns. Thus, he pays special attention to patterns, of which he says that 
4(2)/2016 109
B R E A K I N G M A R I A N O A RT I G A S’ F RO N T I E R S O F E VO L U T I O N I S M
are “closely tied to the ancient concept of form as it was used to refer to the 
modes of being of the different entities”. For Artigas, patterning is a key 
feature of the present worldview:
The process takes places usually as the production of individual patterns that 
reproduce a general type that already exists, but in special circumstances it 
may provoke a new outcome, and a new type of natural pattern is formed and 
eventually retained and reproduced. Both types of patterning are creative 
[…]. In both cases the phenomenon is really remarkable, especially when we 
realize that the construction of our world has required an immense quantity of 
successive processes of patterning, each one of which has opened the door to 
new potentialities that have later been realized. (Artigas 2001, 93)
He understands that this is particularly clear in the case of living beings, 
characterized by a special type of dynamism and patterning that lead to 
strong internal unity and individuality. When nature is viewed through this 
perspective of dynamism and patterning, evolution can be considered as 
a series of morphogenetic processes so that at each step some potentialities 
are actualized depending on the factors at play. This leads to new modes of 
organization that contain novel types of dynamism and potentialities, whose 
deployment results in new levels of organization and so on. This process 
can be regarded as “the deployment of information which, in successive 
levels of organization, results in new informational patterns of increasing 
complexity” (Artigas 2003, 257).
This idea of form is clearly consistent with the view of form that we have 
depicted in the previous section. In the light of evolutionary genomics, form 
can be adequately understood in terms of information deployed through 
developmental programs encoded in modular genetic networks. During 
evolution, new forms arise when such networks change and adapt to specific 
environmental cues, within the constraints of historical developmental 
trajectories. Thus, the evolution of form and function can be described as 
the process whereby developmental programs are modified through the 
rewiring of gene regulatory networks, by processes such as gene duplication 
or by changes in non-coding regulatory sequences.
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In addition, the fact that organisms are constituted by modular gene 
regulatory networks is the basis of phenotypic plasticity and this, in turn, 
explains the mutability and stability required for adaptive evolution. In other 
words, it explains why organisms are capable of evolving and why evolution 
is adaptive. What this means is that evolvability is a necessary property of all 
living beings. This is a very important insight, but unfortunately Artigas was 
not aware of its relevance, or at least did not discuss it at length in his works.
All this is closely linked to another important concept in Artigas’ phi-
losophy of nature, which is the relationship between finality, predictability 
and the role of contingency. Again, it is surprising that he never mentioned 
some of the great debates that took place on this issue within the field of 
evolutionary biology, such as Gould’s defence of contingency in Wonderful 
Life (1990) and the reply by Conway-Morris (1998). In The Mind of the 
Universe, however, there is a whole section on divine action where he tries 
to show that teleology, contingency and necessity can be made compatible 
in the light of chaos theory (Artigas 2001, 145), which eloquently shows 
his bias towards problems and examples taken from the field of physics.
His omission of arguments arising from evolutionary biology is all the 
more surprising, because the concepts that I have illustrated throughout 
this article are crucial in any discussion about finality and contingency. On 
the one hand, the new evolutionary synthesis departs from the gradualist 
dogma and portrays evolution as a tinkerer, whereby extant elements (genes 
or regulatory modules) are co-opted and combined in novel ways so that 
they can provide new solutions to biological problems. But this also means 
that the number of possible combinations is limited, so that within this 
scenario full of contingencies similar phenotypic solutions are frequently 
reached by independent paths, a situation known as convergent evolution. 
The pervasive role of phenotypic convergence in evolution has been reviewed 
elsewhere (Conway-Morris 2003; McGhee 2011) and recent genomic research 
is shedding new light on the mechanisms leading to molecular convergence 
at the genetic level (Parker et al. 2013). Collectively, such studies have 
established the role of regulatory network structure in generating hot-
spots of molecular convergent evolution (Martin and Orgogozo 2013) and 
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suggest that genetic evolution can be historically predictable (Stern 2011). 
For instance, the structure of developmental networks helps to explain why 
some genes are more likely to underlie phenotypic evolution than others 
(Stern 2013). Genes which behave as evolutionary hot-spots are usually 
hubs in gene-regulatory developmental networks. When such networks 
are viewed across evolutionary time, mutations that maximize fitness 
with minimal pleiotropic effects are more likely to be recurrent. In other 
words, the probability that an adaptive mutation is fixed largely depends 
on how it alters development to generate phenotypic change: this is the 
main developmental constraint in evolutionary change at the genetic level 
(Stern 2011, 175 ff).
Conclusion
Given that Artigas’ work is an attempt to show that natural processes, full 
of contingencies, can be reconciled with divine action and finality, I wonder 
how he would have incorporated the lessons learned from evolutionary 
genomics into his argument. He was very fond of a particular passage in 
Aquinas’ Commentary to Aristotle’s Physics, (In Physic., lib. 2 I. 14 n. 8), 
where Aquinas defines nature as “a certain kind of art […] impressed upon 
things, by which these things are moved to a determinate end. It is as if 
the shipbuilder were able to give to timbers that by which they would move 
themselves to take the form of a ship”. This passage reveals a strikingly 
prescient view of the evolutionary nature of organisms, which can pro-
duce new forms by themselves, that is, by their own biological structure. 
Artigas found it “breath-taking”, as it “corresponds literally to the kind of 
self-organization that today we study scientifically” (Artigas 2001, 156). 
For him, the new worldview paves the way for a kind of “comprehensive 
naturalism” in which the role of natural agency is fully recognized, while 
at the same time supported by a founding divine action. I believe that the 
latest advances in evolutionary biology would have helped him greatly to 
progress towards that view.
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